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This paper examines factors leading to state-level fuel ethanol subsidies.  The federal Renewable 
Fuels Standard (RFS2) mandates a certain volume of ethanol production through 2022.  
However, the $6 Billion federal ethanol subsidy expired at the end of 2011.  Because the 
mandated amount of ethanol production from corn continues to increase until 2015, there is 
evidence that ethanol producers may look to the individual states to ensure that higher levels of 
ethanol production remain profitable.  This paper examines factors that have led to state-level 
policies favoring ethanol in order to predict which states will be more likely to increase subsidies 
in the absence of the federal program.   Using a multiple regression model with data from 1996 
through 2010, this project finds that states with larger agricultural sectors and with higher 
degrees of party competition are more likely to subsidize ethanol while party control has no 
significant effect.  
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, US fuel ethanol production has exploded from less than two billion 
gallons in 2001 to nearly fourteen billion gallons in 2011 (US Department of Energy-Biomass 
Program, 2011; Renewable Fuels Association, 2012).  That amounts to nearly ten percent of total 
gasoline production by volume (Energy Information Administration, 2012). This has occurred 
largely as a consequence of government interventions in the marketplace that initially gave 
incentives to ethanol producers and eventually mandated its use.  However, Congress allowed 
the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), amounting to nearly $6 billion in 2011, to 
expire on the first day of 2012.  
 In the wake of VEETC (colloquially known as the “blenders’ credit”), ethanol blenders 
are left with a quantity of use mandated by the federal Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) but no 
price support to ensure profitability.  Additionally, a 54 cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol 
expired along with VEETC so domestic producers no longer have the benefit of protection from 
imported Brazilian ethanol.  However, while direct payments from the federal government to 
blenders accounted for the bulk of ethanol subsidies, there are myriad other policies at both the 
federal and state levels that create incentives for ethanol production and consumption. 
 Because the RFS mandates an increase in corn ethanol production through 2015, it is 
likely that more subsidies will be needed to meet the demand (DOE-Biomass Program, 2010).  
As the federal government becomes less of a player in the ethanol market, producers may look to 
state governments to fill the funding gap.  This paper examines the effects of political and agro-
economic variables on state-level ethanol policies to determine which states are likely to legislate 
more subsidies for ethanol production.  
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History of Ethanol in the US 
 It is important to understand the role that public policy has played in shaping the ethanol 
market.  Ethanol has been distilled from corn in the United States for hundreds of years for the 
purpose of human consumption.  And, the earliest experiments with internal combustion engine 
design in the early 1800s called for high-proof ethanol as the fuel.  The use of ethanol as a motor 
fuel was short-lived though, as a $2 per gallon excise tax on alcohol, created in 1862 to help fund 
the Civil War, made it too expensive (Green Plains, 2012, Gustafson, 2010).  Additionally, the 
original patents of the four stroke engine were coincident with the US oil boom.  Before the 
perfection of the electric light bulb and widespread electrification efforts, gasoline was a bi-
product of lamp oil or kerosene production and was priced accordingly.  With the exception of 
limited use due to wartime fuel shortages, ethanol was dismissed as a motor fuel until the 1970s 
(Kovarick, 1998; Green Plains, 2012; Gustafson, 2010).  
The oil embargo of 1973 renewed interest in ethanol as a supplement for foreign 
petroleum but it was the federal ban of lead fuel additives, beginning in 1975, that provided the 
initial catalyst for large-scale ethanol production ( Green Plains, 2012; Gustafson, 2010).  In 
addition to the ban on lead additives, new machining processes, as well as advancements in 
metallurgical sciences, eliminated the need for lead in modern engines but there was still a need 
for octane boosters or anti-knock agents.  Because the octane rating of pure ethanol is about 113, 
it was a viable option (Kovarick, 1998; Gustafson, 2010).  As a fuel source, ethanol was cost 
prohibitive, but as an octane booster it was competitive with other non-lead options.  However, it 
was still used only on a limited basis.    
The Carter administration ushered in the modern era of federal ethanol support in 1978 
with the creation of a 40 cent tax credit for every gallon of ethanol blended with gasoline 
   3 
 
 
(Glozer, 2011; Gustafson, 2010).   The Energy Security Act of 1980, the Gasohol Competition 
Act of 1980 and the Crude Windfall Tax Act of 1980 offered various new incentives such as 
construction loans for ethanol plants,  imposed a tariff on imported ethanol and extended the per 
gallon subsidy.  In 1983, the subsidy was increased to 50 cents and then 60 cents in 1984 by the 
Surface Transportation Assistance Act and Tax Reform Acts, respectively (Green Plains, 2012).   
By 1985, the ethanol market had peaked at 595 million gallons of production, up from 
just 50 million in 1980.  Additionally, over the same time period, production facilities 
skyrocketed from less than 10 to 163.  This saturated the market and even with the 60 cent per 
gallon subsidy, less than half of those plants were still operating at the end of 1985.  In spite of 
the federal government’s best efforts, ethanol production increased only marginally over the next 
15 years.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 reduced the subsidy to 54 cents and 
in 1998 it was extended yet again but with a scheduled reduction to 51 cents by 2005.  Still, by 
2000 production had reached over 1.6 billion gallons.  The continued growth may partially be 
attributed to the first state-level subsidies passed in 1995-96, as well as limited production of 
flex-fuel vehicles capable of operating on 85% ethanol blends (Glozer, 2011; Green Plains, 
2012).  
An amendment to the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1990 piqued new interest in ethanol.  
Smog problems in larger metropolitan areas (primarily Los Angeles) provoked mandatory fuel 
oxygenate additives to reduce airborne pollutants (EPA, 2012).  As the name implies, oxygenates 
increase the amount of oxygen present in gasoline in order to make it burn more thoroughly.  
Ethanol is an excellent oxygenate but due to the price, Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) was 
the additive of choice throughout the 1990s.  However, MTBE did not break down when leaked 
from gasoline storage tanks and created massive ground water contamination problems. 
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Consequently, states started banning the additive in 2000 and only a few still allow it.  Following 
the widespread ban on MTBE, ethanol became the most cost-effective oxygenate and its 
production subsequently increased dramatically (Kovarick, 1998; Green Plains, 2012; Gustafson, 
2010). 
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 reauthorized the federal subsidy as the VEETC 
with an immediate reduction to 51 cents and it was again reduced to 45 cents by the 2008 Farm 
Bill (DOE-Energy Information Administration, 2012).  More importantly, the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 introduced the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) which mandated the use of certain 
quantities of different types of renewable fuels.  Then, the Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007 amended the RFS (now called RFS2) to require even more renewable fuels (Green 
Plains, 2012; Gustafson, 2010).   
Following the Energy Policy Act of 2005, federal ethanol policies expanded.  
Accordingly, only the most substantive current policies are mentioned here.  All flex fuel 
vehicles (FFVs) in the federal fleet are now required to burn E85 when available.  As an 
incentive for automotive manufacturers to build FFVs, credits are given for each FFV produced 
to effectively increase the company’s Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE).  In other 
words, FFVs have an artificially high fuel economy rating for the purposes of reporting CAFE 
figures (DOE-Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 2011).  The alternative fuel 
Infrastructure tax credit covers 30% of the costs (up to $30,000) of adding ethanol-related 
infrastructure at fueling stations.  The Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) provides loan 
guarantees for 25% of the cost (up to $25 million) of building ethanol plants.  The small ethanol 
producer tax credit returns 10 cents on every gallon of ethanol produced, up to 15 million 
gallons, for plants that produce less than 60 million gallons annually.  Finally, in August, 2011 
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the EPA began granting waivers to increase the allowable amount of ethanol blended into 
gasoline from 10 percent (E10) to 15 percent (E15) but the effects of that have yet to be seen 
(EPA, 2011; RFA, 2012; DOE-Alternative Fuel and Advanced Vehicle Data Center, 2012a).  
Ethanol’s Dependence on the Government 
 It should be evident at this point that the current ethanol market is largely the product of 
government intervention.  Consequently, it is a market that is now very much dependent on 
public policy.  By and large, this is due to ethanol production volumes mandated by the RFS.  
But, as the following section discusses, the story is more complex. 
 When the production of a good is mandated by public policy, there is no guarantee that it 
will be a profitable endeavor for those who aim to produce it.  It should not be surprising then, 
that governments would ensure that the production target is met either by use of the proverbial 
carrot or stick.  However, ethanol subsidies essentially function as farm price supports and when 
agricultural interests are on the receiving end of public policy, the stick has typically been 
discarded in favor of the carrot (Gardner,2007).  Moreover, with VEETC the role of the 
“blender” is played almost exclusively by major oil companies.  It is difficult to determine which 
one of these interests currently holds the most political clout but it is fair to say that they are both 
contenders for the top spot. 
Since the initial introduction of the RFS in 2005, researchers have studied the continued 
need for a per-gallon ethanol subsidy.  However, the extant literature emanates mostly from 
fields closely related to economics.  The price of the ethanol subsidy has been calculated as a 
function of the price of ethanol and other commodities as well as the production volume 
mandated by RFS2.  
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To understand this relationship, a quick note on the implementation mechanism of the 
RFS is warranted.  A 38-character Renewable Identification Number (RIN) is attached to each 
gallon of every batch of ethanol produced.  The RINs denote when the ethanol was produced, 
who made it and where it was produced, along with various other information.  When that 
ethanol is blended with gasoline, the RINs are separated from the fuel and allocated to the 
blender.  Obligated parties (blenders) may then trade the RINs on an electronic market 
moderated by the EPA, forfeit them to the EPA for RFS compliance or allow them to “rollover” 
to meet up to 20% of a future year’s RIN requirement.  RINs provide proof to the EPA that each 
party has met its blending quota for each fiscal year.  If a party actually blends the required 
volume of ethanol then it can use its own RINs for compliance.  But if a party blends less than its 
mandated volume of ethanol it can purchase RINs from other parties who have blended in 
excess.  The RIN market thus ensures that the marginal cost of blending for each party is equal, 
and therefore, the burden of the RFS is spread evenly across the entire market.  In essence, the 
RIN market is the opposite of a cap-and-trade program.  
The price of RINs varies based on a number of factors including tax credits, the price of 
crude oil and corn, and because speculators may register with the EPA, there is a speculative 
component in the RIN price (USDA –Economic Research Service, 2011).  Tyner (2010) suggests 
that the relationship between these variables is rather simple.  At a given price of corn, ethanol 
will be profitable only if the price of oil is high enough that gasoline becomes more expensive 
than ethanol.  At this point, the demand for ethanol will drive production levels above the RFS 
mandate and the price of RINs will go down.  Conversely, if oil is cheap relative to ethanol, 
ethanol production will be very low and the RFS will be binding.  Accordingly, high-priced 
RINs indicate a binding RFS and low-priced RINs indicate a non-binding RFS.  Though 
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different model parameters have been used, this basic relationship has been examined 
extensively (Babcock, 2012; Cui et al., 2011; de Gorter et al., 2008; de Gorter et al., 2009; 
Gardner, 2007; Tyner et al., 2011).   
Based on the price of RINs, Tyner (2010) suggests that either the RFS was binding in the 
last quarter of 2008, or projected production levels were low enough that obligated parties feared 
that it soon would be.  This is important because it is the only time since the inception of the RFS 
that production has been in danger of falling below the mandate.  In other words, virtually no 
ethanol has ever been produced from corn as a result of the RFS.  This may be surprising to some 
but ethanol has actually been very profitable, especially in light of VEETC.  However, two 
factors suggest that overproduction of ethanol will soon be a thing of the past.  Shortly after the 
federal subsidy dried up, so did most cropland in the US corn belt. 
On August 10
th
, the USDA lowered the estimated US corn harvest to 10.8 billion bushels.  
This is a 13% reduction from 2011 and a 17% reduction from the July estimate (NASS, 2012).  
Because of this, Babcock (2012) predicts that 2.4 billion of the estimated 2.6 billion carryover 
RINs will be used to meet the RFS for FY2013.  As a result, ethanol prices will increase by over 
6% and the price of corn will increase by 8% compared to what they would be in the absence of 
the RFS.  While this reflects a modest increase, if it were not for carryover RINs, the price of 
ethanol would increase by 25% and corn prices would increase by 26%, according to Babcock’s 
model.  Fortunately, carryover RINs create a substantial degree of flexibility in the RFS, but 
because there will be only about 200 million carryover RINs for FY2014, the model is a strong 
indicator of what might be expected if the 2013 corn harvest does not rebound.   
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State Involvement in Ethanol Subsidies 
Based on Babcock’s predictions, another small corn harvest in 2013 could send RIN 
prices soaring to well over a dollar, compared to the current price of less than 5 cents.  Obligated 
parties are already asking for an emergency RFS waiver and if the corn harvest fails to recover in 
2013, pressure from oil interests will only increase.  However, because a waiver would supress 
corn prices (as Babcock’s model reflects) it will not be welcomed by agricultural interests.  A 
direct subsidy such as VEETC though, makes both the oil and agricultural interests happy.  
However, congress let the VEETC expire, partially due to the current budget crunch, and it is 
unlikely that it will be politically feasible to allocate the $6 Billion necessary to reinstate it.  The 
oil and agricultural lobbies know this and they may be forced to look to the individual states for 
ethanol subsidies.  
It is hardly worth mentioning the profound effects of interest group politics in the US.  
While the term often carries a negative connotation, the edited volumes of Interest Group 
Politics in America and Interest Group Politics represent only a small sample of the research 
suggesting that interest groups are the de facto means through which citizen preferences gain 
legislative consideration (Hrebener & Scott; Cigler & Loomis).  Specifically relevant to this 
topic, Gilbert and Oladi (2012) , and Gawande and Hoekman (2006) have documented the direct 
effects of the agricultural and oil lobbies on US trade policy.  Similarly, Holloway et al. (2008) 
and Stratmann (1995) have indicated the power of the agricultural lobby on US farm bills.   
Most of the studies aiming to quantify the power of interest groups have looked directly 
at total or net (difference between contributions to each candidate) campaign contributions.  
While this measurement is one indicator of interest group strength, the data it requires becomes 
very elusive at the state level and is beyond the scope of this project.  Instead, it is assumed that 
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the power of agricultural interests may be indicated by the relative size of the agricultural sector 
in each state. Therefore: 
H1: States with larger agricultural sectors are more likely to subsidize ethanol. 
 
Additionally, countless studies have reported the effects of partisanship on policy 
outcomes.  In fact, V.O. Key (1967, pp.432) suggested that “parties are the basic institutions for 
the translation of mass preference into public policy.”  Partisanship has been linked to policy 
outcomes such as welfare and redistribution, gerrymandering and even public budget outcomes 
(Brown, 1995; Cox & Katz, 2002; Phillips, 2008; Plotnick & Winters, 1990). However, previous 
research suggests that US agricultural policies typically occur across partisan boundaries (Gilbert 
& Oladi, 2012; Mercier, 2011).  Because of this, it is likely that partisan competition will have a 
greater effect on agricultural policy outcomes than partisanship.  That is, states with closely 
divided partisan control should be more likely to cater to the agricultural interests.  Most of the 
studies examining the causes and effects of partisanship have considered both of these variables.  
A gross simplification of these studies is that outcomes that are not typically linked to a 
particular party are often correlated with high levels of interparty competition.  The simplest 
explanation of this phenomenon is that supporting the American farmer is almost a universal 
value in the US.  Similar examples might be tax breaks for the middle class, balancing the budget 
or getting tougher on crime.  When it comes to these issues, political feasibility often outweighs 
logic and candidates may wind up in a race to give more and more in order to steal votes from 
the opposing party without alienating their core constituencies. Therefore:   
H2: State partisanship does not affect ethanol subsidies. 
H3: States with high levels of party competition are more likely to subsidize ethanol 
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Data 
Dependent Variable 
 As should be evident in the preceding discussion, the ethanol market has been shaped by 
policies with unintended consequences.  However, the goal of this study is to determine factors 
that have shaped state-level ethanol policies in the US.  Consequently, defining and measuring 
ethanol subsidies is an important part of this project.   
The World Trade Organization suggests that subsidies should have a direct intentional 
effect on a particular market (WTO, 1979).  Additionally, the WTO’s official definition of a 
subsidy states that there must either be a direct transfer of funds from the government, foregone 
government revenue that would have otherwise been due (such as tax credits and exemptions) or 
government provided goods or services (WTO, 1994).  While the WTO’s definition provides a 
good starting point for measuring ethanol subsidies, it is not all-inclusive.   
The International Institute for Sustainable Development describes a dozen different 
methods for subsidizing a market (Koplow, 2007).  Most importantly, regulations, mandates and 
import tariffs make up a notable portion of the US ethanol policy menu.  Incorporating those 
policies into the WTO’s definition gets closer to meeting the needs of this project. 
Steenblik (2003) points out that “there is no universally accepted definition of a subsidy” 
and that it would be “pointless and fruitless to argue for a conceptually perfect definition.” (pp 
102).  But he goes on to warn that the criteria used for measuring the subsidy certainly matter.  
Bruce (2003) recommends, quite simply, that the definition should be in accordance with the 
available data and should serve the purpose for which it was intended.  An amalgam of different 
sections of each of these definitions might fit Bruce’s criteria but it would be unnecessarily 
complex.  For the purpose of operationalizing the concept of subsidies as a dependent variable, 
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the term refers simply to any government policies intended to artificially increase the supply of 
or demand for ethanol in the US.   
Past researchers have experimented with a variety of methods for measuring subsidies.  
The price-gap approach has been the most common measurement among researchers studying 
energy subsidies (Koplow, 2007).  This method aims to determine the difference in the current 
price of a good in a particular market and the price that it would be in the absence of subsidies.  
This method is unsuitable here for many reasons.  Most importantly, it is very complex and data 
intensive.  Additionally, the method relies on a global reference price and, because the US 
dominates the world ethanol market, this number is nearly impossible to discern.  Finally, as 
Koplow (2007) points out, this method does little to capture the effects of non-monetary 
subsidies.  
Another method that is frequently used to quantify subsidies is simply to account for the 
monetary transfers associated with each program.  This is the most obvious method but it is also 
data intensive and it does not even consider non-monetary subsidies (International Energy 
Agency, 1999; Koplow, 2007).  
Finally, Harry de Gorter of Cornell University has made a career of measuring and 
describing subsidies in different global markets.  He has even devoted a paper specifically to the 
measurement of global biofuels subsidies (de Gorter, 2008).  But again, his work does not 
account for all biofuel incentives.  Moreover, he is measuring subsidies in a global context and 
data that is available and works at the national level is either not available or is not useful at the 
state level.  Ultimately, his measurement is no better suited for this project than any of the others. 
It is clear that part of the problem with previous measurements is that they aim to convert 
all subsidies into dollars.  Any such method will have difficulty capturing the effects of laws and 
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regulations such as the RFS.  Part of the problem here is that this project is concerned more with 
the policy than the subsidy.  Unfortunately, those who have attempted to quantify policies on a 
broad scale have had even less success than those measuring subsidies.   
Reisman et al. (2007) suggest that measuring policy outcomes has become increasingly 
important in the field of non-profit grant writing.  Accordingly, non-profits have turned to 
program evaluation and policy analysis techniques to defend their work and prove their 
effectiveness.  Though the context of their work is different, they make a point that is equally 
important for this project.  Essentially, measuring policy outputs (what policies have been 
enacted) is not the same as measuring the outcomes of policies (what have those policies done).  
Most studies fall in line with that of Reisman et al. in that they seek to determine the latter.  One 
reason for this is that it is often not difficult to draw a straight line from a policy to a result but it 
can be very difficult to draw the line from an action to the enactment of a policy.   
Guthrie et al. (2005) state that there are no standard practices or commonly used methods 
or tools for measuring policy.  Yet Guthrie et al. and Reisman et al. (2007) both suggest that 
knowing what to measure is at least as important as how it is measured.  Reisman et al. go on to 
say that it is important to describe a set of policy outcome categories.  While none of these 
authors has offered a measurement scheme that fits neatly into this project, they have provided 
enough information to develop one. 
The first attempt at a measurement was simply to add up the number of ethanol subsidies 
in each state.  This method quickly illustrated the need to develop outcome categories as 
suggested by Reisman et al. (2007).  The reason was that some states have one policy that offers 
a number of incentives which may be separated into two or three different policies in another 
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state.  Using the simple count method would have given the latter state credit for three subsidies 
while the former was credited for only one.   
Creating a set of categories simplified the process so that each policy was counted 
equally across states.  Additionally, in the many instances where a state had more than one policy 
that fit into the same category, it was given credit for only one.  Initially, this would appear to 
undercount a large number of policies.  However, it is quite clear that states with multiple 
policies in a single category tend to dilute the overall effect across multiple separate policies.  
And again, just because there are two or more policies does not mean that another state might not 
offer all of the same benefits with a single policy. 
Finally, as previously mentioned, it is both futile and unnecessary to try to quantify the 
individual effects of each subsidy category.  Still, it is quite clear that different categories have 
varying impacts on supply and demand in the ethanol market.  Accordingly, not all categories 
were counted the same.  The following section describes each of the subsidy categories and how 
they were counted. 
The list of state-level ethanol subsidies used for this project comes primarily from the US 
Department of Energy’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy-Alternative Fuels Data 
Center (AFDC).  The AFDC information on state incentives and laws was checked against 
compilations of subsidy information available from the American Coalition for Ethanol (ACE) 
and the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA).  ACE and RFA are private associations (essentially 
lobby groups) and their standard for an ethanol incentive appears to be marginally higher than 
that of the AFDC.  In cases where there was a discrepancy, the subsidy was included in this 
measurement only if it fit into one of the categories listed below.  Finally, in the cases of 
conflicting information between these three sources, state legislative websites were consulted for 
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resolution.  Accordingly, it is not likely that any substantive subsidies were left out of the 
measurement.  Policies were included in this measure if they were in effect in January of 2012. 
By far, the most common policy across all states was a requirement that state agencies 
make some effort to purchase flex fuel vehicles (FFVs) for their fleets.  The exact means of 
applying preference to FFVs over non-FFVs varies, but the intent is generally the same.  In 
addition to the FFV acquisition requirement, most states require that those vehicles actually use 
E85 when it is available.  States with both the acquisition and usage requirement were given a 
score of 1.  States with one or the other were given half credit (.5).  Across the US, 34 states have 
some type of FFV acquisition requirement while 30 have an E85 usage mandate.   
The second most common category included some type of state-sponsored ethanol 
promotion or education program, or a state ethanol commission.  Promotion and education 
programs vary greatly across states but commissions are typically set up to study the state of the 
ethanol industry and advise the state legislature at prescribed time intervals.  The effect of each 
of these programs was perceived to be small and this category was scored as .5 accordingly.  
Policies fitting this category were found in 24 states. 
Monetary incentives for ethanol infrastructure made up the next category and these 
policies exist in 22 states.  Incentives in this category range from tax credits/exemptions to grants 
and loan guarantees.  States with an incentive for E10 blends were given full credit of 1.  
Additionally, there are six states with separate incentives for E85 infrastructure.  These states 
were given an additional score of .5 because E85 accounts for a very small portion of the total 
ethanol consumed in the US.   
Monetary incentives for ethanol production were divided into two categories.  Incentives 
for the construction of ethanol production facilities are similar to the incentives provided for 
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infrastructure but often take the form of property tax exemptions.  Sixteen states received a score 
of 1 for policies in this category.  The other category of production incentives is a per-gallon 
subsidy.  These incentives take the form of direct payments or tax credits and range from 5 to 20 
cents.  Fifteen states were scored 1 for having policies in this category. 
Retail incentives account for the next category.  These are provided as excise, sales or use 
tax exemptions, a VAT exemption (Michigan has a VAT on retail gasoline) that is passed on to 
the consumer by law, flat-rate alternative fuel taxes, tax rebates and various other forms.  These 
incentives are relatively small however, and rarely amount to more than a few cents.  Incentives 
for E10 were scored 1 while E85 incentives were scored .5 for the same reasons discussed above.  
In total, 18 states offer some type of E10 incentive and 10 offer one for E85. 
Another category was policies encouraging ethanol research and development.  While 
many states promote research and development for advanced biofuels (not made from corn), only 
17 have some type of incentive that applies to ethanol made from corn.  Again, these policies 
vary significantly but most provide research grants in some form.  While some policies, such as 
Illinois’ National Corn-to-Ethanol Research Center (NCERC), channel tens of millions of dollars 
into ethanol research, most are modest investments and any effect is likely to be very long-term.  
For these reasons, the category received a score of .5.  
Many states offer an incentive for the production or purchase of FFVs.  These come in 
the form of tax credits or rebates and even payroll tax deductions based on the number of jobs 
created by the production of FFVs.  However, over 10 percent of light-duty vehicles produced in 
the US are already FFVs (largely because of the reduced federal CAFE standard mentioned 
above) so these policies probably have little effect (AFDC, 2012c; d).  For this reason, and 
because of the marginal levels of E85 consumption, this category received a score of .5.  
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The final category of ethanol subsidies is a usage mandate.  These mandates look similar 
to the federal RFS but often have complex schedules depending on a number of variables and 
ethanol usage benchmarks.  California and Oregon have adopted low-carbon fuel standards 
(LCFS) which essentially act as an ethanol mandate.  Even though the California LCFS has been 
challenged in federal courts, the intent of the policy remains and the state received the full score 
of 1. In addition to California and Oregon, 10 other states mandate some quantity of ethanol 
consumption.  
 
Table 1. Ethanol Subsidy Index Components 
Policy Score 
Preference for flex-fuel vehicles in government fleet 0.5 
E85 usage mandate for government fleet vehicles 0.5 
Promotion, education or commission on ethanol 0.5 
Ethanol research and development incentive 0.5 
Incentive for production or purchase of flex-fuel vehicles 0.5 
Incentive for ethanol infrastructure 1 
Incentive for E85 infrastructure 0.5 
Ethanol production incentive per gallon 1 
Ethanol production incentive per facility 1 
At-the-pump retail incentive for E10 1 
At-the-pump retail incentive for E85 0.5 
Renewable fuels standard or low carbon fuels standard 1 
Possible score 8.5 
Source: Data from USDOE Alternative Fuels Data Center, American Coalition for  
Ethanol and Renewable Fuels Association.  Index created by author. 
 
When added together, these scores yield the ethanol subsidy index for each state.  
Possible index scores range from 0 to 8.5.  Actual scores range from 0 (West Virginia, Wyoming 
and Utah) to 7 (Iowa).  The index scores roughly follow a standard distribution with the 
exception of the Midwestern states with scores over 6 (Figure 1).  
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Figure 2 reflects the geographical distribution of state-level ethanol subsidies.  It is clear 
that ethanol subsidies are high in the Midwestern states.  States that subsidize ethanol very little 
are concentrated in the West and Northeast.  A notable exception is West Virginia where a law 
actually bans any ethanol subsidies by any political subdivision of the state.   
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Figure 1. State Level Ethanol 
Subsidies in the US (2012) 
Source: DOE-Alternative Fuels Data Center, 
American Coalition for Ethanol, Renewable 
Fuels Association 
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I acknowledge that this index is a low-resolution indicator of ethanol subsidies in US 
states.  However, anyone looking at the measurement and the data is likely to conclude that the 
index has face validity, and that the relative hierarchy of state ethanol subsidies is an accurate 
reflection of reality.  Additionally, based on the previous definitions of a subsidy outlined above, 
the index has content validity.  That is, there should be no policies included in this measure that 
are not part of the subsidy concept and everything that should be included is accounted for.    
Finally, using the description of the index detailed above, the same measurement should be 
easily reproduced for studies of other time periods or locations.  Ultimately, the measurement is 
as reliable and valid as is necessary for this project. 
Figure 2 State Level Ethanol Subsidization 
in the US (2010) 
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Independent Variables 
 Size of the agricultural sector. Measurements of the independent variables are in 
accordance with a well-worn path in the academic literature.  Consequently, they require less 
explanation.  The size of the agricultural sector in each state was operationalized through two 
measurements.  The share of field crop production as a share of Gross State Product (GSP) was 
the first measurement.  Field crop production was used as opposed to total agricultural 
production because it excludes livestock farming, and fruit and vegetable farms, neither of which 
should be expected to be an indicator of ethanol subsidies.  Data for GSP was retrieved from the 
US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  There is a small 
discrepancy in the data however, as the BEA switched from the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 
to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in 1997.  The data is available 
for both systems in 1997 though, and the differences between the values from each classification 
system average .5 percent, with a range of .08 to 4.9%.  Field crop production data comes from 
the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  The final measure is a 15 year 
average percentage for each state spanning 1996 to 2010.  
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Figure 3. Field Crop Share of SDP in US 
(1996-2010) 
Source: US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, USDA-National Agricultural 
Statistics Service 
   20 
 
 
 
Actual values for this measure range from .01% in Rhode Island to 16.2% in North 
Dakota with an average of 1.9%.  Figure 3 reveals that values of this variable are highly skewed 
to the right as field crop production accounts for less than 2% of the GSP in 41 states.  More 
interesting is the geographic distribution of this variable shown in Figure 4.  Though Iowa and 
Illinois produce the most corn, field crops account for a smaller percentage of GSP in those 
states than in Nebraska and the Dakotas.    
 
 
 
Figure 4 Field Crop Share of SDP in the US 
(1996-2010) 
   21 
 
 
The agricultural sector was also measured by state employment in crop production as a 
percentage of total employment.  The US Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) provided data for total employment and employment in crop production.  Note that the 
BLS does not aggregate data for field crops.  Consequently, this measure does exclude livestock 
production but it includes most fruit and vegetable farms.  Even though this measure is not as 
ideal as one including only field crops, it is the best available and it may even offer some insight 
regarding the effects of the agricultural lobby in a broader sense.  Again, this variable is the 
average share of employment in the crop production sector over a 15 year period from 1996 to 
2010. 
 
 
The percentage of employment in crop production ranged from .05% in Alaska to a little 
over 2% in Washington, with an average of .35%.  As expected, the frequency distribution of this 
variable looks very similar to that of the previous measure (Figure 5).  However, the geographic 
distribution in Figure 6 reveals an entirely different pattern.   This likely reflects the high 
percentage of labor-intensive fruit and vegetable farms on the west coast and in Florida. 
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Figure 5. Employment in Crop 
Production in the US (1996-2010) 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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 State partisan balance.  The other independent variable was state partisan balance.  
King (1989, pp.83) suggests that “The literature on American state politics is replete with 
measures of party competition.” However, the Ranney Index is by far the most frequently cited 
measure of partisan balance (Ranney, 1965; Tucker, 1982).  This measure incorporates the 
percentage of seats in the state legislature held by Democrats, the percentage of Democratic 
votes in gubernatorial elections, and the percentage of years that Democrats controlled each 
house of the legislature over a given period of time.  These percentages are then averaged 
Figure 6 Employment in Crop Production 
in the US (1996-2010) 
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together to yield the Ranney Index for each state.  Possible scores range from 0 (meaning 
complete Republican control) to 1 (meaning complete Democratic control).  Ranney labels 
possible categories as one-party Republican (.0-.09), modified one-party Republican (.1-.29), 
two-party (.3-.69), modified one-party Democratic (.7-.89) and one-party Democratic (.9 or 
higher).  Based on these categories, the Ranney index is more accurately a measure of 
partisanship or party control than of party competition.  Because the Index was intended to give a 
running average of partisanship, it is well suited to the current study period of 1996-2010.  
However, the Ranney Index has some flaws and nearly every author referencing it has modified 
it to fit their needs.  Such is the case here.   
One problem with the Ranney Index is that it assumes there are truly only two parties.  
Consequently, seats and votes not counted as Democratic are allocated to the Republican Party 
by default.  Due to the increase in independent and third-party candidates, seats and votes were 
counted as a percentage of the two-party total.  Accordingly, third-party and independent votes 
and seats were summarily omitted from the measure.  While this modification is effective for the 
measures of partisanship in the legislature, it is not as well-suited to the few cases where non-
major party candidates were actually elected to the governorship.  Finally, because Nebraska has 
a non-partisan, unicameral legislature, only the measure of gubernatorial votes was used.   
Data for all political party variables was aggregated from two sources.  Most data is 
available from the various editions of The Council of State Governments’ The Book of the States.  
While this data is correct most of the time, there are numerous issues such as special elections 
that are not reported, seats vacated or filled in the middle of a term, and even mis-transcribed 
entries.  To ensure the accuracy of the data used here, it was verified against a dataset provided 
by Karl Klarner of Indiana State University.  Klarner has built a career on accurately recording 
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and measuring the partisan balance of US states and his dataset accounts for every imaginable 
anomaly in measures of state partisan balance (Klarner, 2003; 2011).  The only reason Klarner’s 
dataset was not used in its entirety is that The Book of the States aggregates the data in a fashion 
that was more easily formatted for this analysis. 
 
  
Calculated scores for the Ranney Index from 1996 to 2010 ranged from .26 in Nebraska 
to .8131 in Maryland with an average of .52.  The data for this measure roughly follows a normal 
distribution but the scores are clustered closer to the mean than they were when Ranney 
calculated them in 1965, 1973 and 1976 (Figure 7).  Consequently, the categories are adjusted 
slightly as shown in Figure 8.  Values at the extremes were labelled simply as Republican and 
Democratic because they are not really one-party systems in the sense that Ranney originally 
suggested.  Also, to account for the lack of such extreme scores, the categorical divisions are 
now, .0-.29, .3-.39, .4-.59, .6-.69 and 7 or higher.  Each time Ranney revisited this measure, he 
suggested that these scores are likely to be surprising to most viewers (Ranney, 1965; 1973; 
1976).  This is because people tend to have an idea of each state’s partisan affiliation at the 
national level rather than the state level.  Looking at the geographic distribution of this variable 
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reveals that this still holds true (Figure 8).  He attributes this to the long time period covered by 
the index and the fact that it is based wholly on state offices.    
 
 
 
 The Ranney Index was further modified in order to yield the second measure of partisan 
balance.  The folded Ranney Index is a direct measure of party competition without regards to 
the actual party in control (Ranney, 1965).  This is necessary because the Ranney Index is a 
measure of partisanship rather than party competition.  The Ranney Index is folded by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between each score and .5, and subtracting that number from 1.  
Figure 8 Partisanship in US State Governments 
(1996-2010) 
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The result is a score with a possible range of .5 to 1, where higher scores indicate higher levels of 
competition.  
Again, scores for the folded Ranney Index were calculated for the 1996 – 2010 period. 
They averaged .87 with a range of .69 in Maryland to .99 in New York.  The frequency 
distribution shown in Figure 9 is a relic of the folding method and essentially reflects half of the 
distribution curve for the Ranney Index.     
 
 
 
The geographic distribution of this measure looks similar to that of the Ranney Index, 
where two-party states are the most competitive, followed by modified states (Figure 10).  The 
minor differences between the map of the Ranney Index and the folded Ranney index are results 
of different symbology.  In order to show more detail here, the range of data was broken up into 
five equal categories.  Again, this data may be surprising as some of the traditional “swing 
states” in Presidential elections reflect very low levels of competition at the state level and vice 
versa. 
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For the sake of clarification, the Ranney Index is a direct measure of partisanship or party 
control, and any of these terms may be used with the same meaning.  The folded Ranney Index 
measures party competition without regard to the majority party, and again, these terms may be 
used interchangeably.  Both of these variables measure the concept of partisan balance.  
  
 
  
Methods and Results 
 In order to gauge the effect of these agro-economic and political variables on ethanol 
subsidies, a method is required which will account for any relationship between the independent 
variables.  Specifically, the political landscape of each state may be dependent, to some degree, 
Figure 10 Party Competition in US State 
Governments (1996-2010) 
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on the agricultural sector.  A multiple regression model was used in order to control for this and 
similar effects. 
 Any time more than one measure is used to quantify the same concept, there is a potential for 
collinearity.  This was an initial cause for concern here and was dealt with accordingly.  Most 
obviously, the folded Ranney Index is a mathematical derivative of the Ranney index.  However, 
because the transformation is non-linear, variance inflation factors were below 1.4 for both 
variables.  Moreover, the two measures have been used together extensively in previous projects 
(Tucker, 1982).  Any relationship between the agricultural variables is likely to be linear, but 
again, variance inflation factors were less than 1.3.  As discussed above, the incorporation of 
labor-intensive fruit and vegetable farms into the crop employment variable probably accounts 
for low levels of collinearity that might have otherwise been present.   
 The results of the regression are presented in Table 1.  While the overall fit of the model is 
low (  =.264), it is significant at the .01 level.  More importantly, employment in crop 
production, the field crop share of GSP and party competition (Folded Ranney Index) all have 
statistically significant positive effects on state-level ethanol subsidies just as expected.  The fact 
that partisanship (Ranney Index) shows no effect is also consistent with previous research.   
Table 2   Estimated Effect on Ethanol Subsidies   
 Estimate (Std. Error) Beta 
Employment in Crop Prod. 107.273* (56.13) .251 
Field Crop Production/GSP 23.560** (7.87) .429 
Partisanship 2.554 (1.75) .219 
Party Competition 8.101** (2.99) .381 
* p < .05, one-tailed test    
** p < .01, one-tailed test    
 
The standardized coefficients reveal the first unexpected result.  The significant effect of 
party competition was expected but the relative magnitude of that effect is far stronger than the 
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theory would have suggested.  An upper-bound estimate would have been that party competition 
has half the effect of either agricultural variable.  But the effect was only 11% lower than the 
field crop share of GSP and 52% higher than that of employment in crop production.  Because 
Beta is strictly relative, it is still not clear whether the effect of party competition was really that 
strong or if the effects of the agriculture sector measurements were much weaker than expected. 
Because the Beta coefficient compares the effects of increasing each independent 
variable by one standard deviation, it inflates the effects of those with values less clustered 
around the mean.  The standard deviation of the folded Ranney Index is relatively small (less 
than 10% of the mean) while the standard deviations of the field crop share of GSP and 
employment in crop production are relatively large (174% and 114% of the mean, respectively).  
Furthermore, the standard deviation of the folded Ranney Index is half of what it should be in 
light of the fact that it has been cut in half and the true zero point is .5 (Tucker, 1982). Taking 
this into consideration would lead to a Beta that is substantially higher than that of any other 
variable.  The problem with comparing Beta values here is that the partisan balance variables 
actually vary temporally more than the standard deviations would suggest.  That is, the 15 year 
averaged value of these variables used here masks a considerable amount of variability from one 
year to the next.  The converse is true for the agricultural variables.  There is great variance 
geographically but no single state changes that much from one year to the next.  Accordingly, a 
different method of comparison is used to see the relative effects of increasing each independent 
variable by 10% of its mean value.  The effects shown by this method are far different than the 
Beta coefficients indicated. 
A 10% increase over the average percentage of employment in crop production results in 
an estimated 1.2% increase of the average ethanol subsidy index value.  That is, if employment 
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in crop production increases from .35% (the average value across states) to .385% we would 
predict the ethanol subsidy index will increase from 2.99 (again, the average value) to 3.02.  
Using the same convention, a 10% increase in the average field crop share of GSP will yield a 
1.4% increase in the average ethanol subsidy index.  Finally, a 10% increase in the average 
folded Ranney Index will result in a 20.3% increase in the average ethanol subsidy index.  This 
measure suggests that the effect of party competition is greater than either agricultural variable 
by a magnitude of nearly 20.  This analysis strays from standard convention but the effect of 
party competition is higher than expected by any measure. 
Though the effects of party competition have been well documented in other contexts, it 
is not clear why the effect is so strong in comparison to measures of the agricultural sector.  The 
most likely cause is measurement error.  The folded Ranney Index has been proven to be a 
reliable and direct measure of party competition.  Conversely, the measures of the agricultural 
sector are merely supposed proxies for the size and strength of the agricultural lobby in each 
state.  It may actually be more accurate to suggest that the agricultural lobby is the mechanism 
through which the agro-economic variables affect policy outputs.  In either case, a more direct 
measure may have been more appropriate.  Another possible cause is that employment in crop 
production is skewed because fruit and vegetable farms are more labor intensive.  Consequently, 
states such as Florida and California have relatively high percentages of employment in this 
sector even though there is no reason to believe that they would be particularly likely to 
subsidize ethanol.  Finally, policy decisions are made by politicians and when they don’t need 
anything from the agricultural lobby (i.e. times of low competition) they are much less likely to 
cater to their needs.  However, when competition is high, politicians will do much to gain 
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support of the lobby.  In other words, the size of the agricultural sector only matters when there 
is high competition and competition only matters when there is a large agricultural sector.  
The reason that party competition matters when partisanship does not is fairly obvious.  
Subsidies for American farmers enjoy bipartisan support.  When parties (or individual 
candidates) face tough competition, they will both offer more legislation that will appeal to 
voters of all political ideologies.  Therefore, high levels of competition lead to high levels of 
ethanol subsidies.  For the same reason, there is not likely to be a change in ethanol subsidization 
when either party enjoys a comfortable margin of control because both parties are equally as 
likely (or unlikely) to subsidize ethanol.  
With an    of only .264, it is important to suggest some other variables that might 
account for the almost 74% of variance in ethanol subsidies not explained by the model.  As 
discussed previously, the measurements of the agricultural sector may not have accurately 
represented the underlying cause of subsidies.  Other measures of interest group power maylead 
to a model with more predictive power.  Furthermore, the averaged values of the independent 
variables probably conceal some of the effects that might otherwise have been apparent.  A 
model that accounted for the political and agro-economic landscape at the time each ethanol 
subsidy was passed would probably yield different results.  But most importantly, this model 
does nothing to account for the fiscal situation in each state.  I have suggested that the federal 
government is not likely to increase subsidies due to the budget crunch at that level.  However, 
each state has a different economic situation and those who are operating in the red may be just 
as unlikely to subsidize ethanol as the federal government is.  Simply averaging each state’s 
deficit or debt as a percentage of GSP over the study period may have increased the strength of 
the model.  
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Where did the Model Perform Well? 
The map in Figure 11 shows the standard residuals for each state.  Because there are 50 
states, we already know that about 35 of them fall within plus or minus one standard deviation of 
the predicted subsidy index scores.  However, knowing the states that do not may be of as much 
value as any of the previous analysis.  The states falling above one standard deviation have 
subsidized ethanol more than the model would have predicted while those below one standard 
deviation have subsidized it less.  Because the predictive power of the overall model was low, a 
closer look at these states may lead to a better understanding of the causes of ethanol subsidies. 
 
 
Figure 11 Predicted Ethanol Subsidies in the US   
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Conclusion 
 The US ethanol market is clearly a product of government intervention in one form or another.  
It has been shaped by public policy dating back to the tax on alcohol used to fund the Civil War.  
Because the federal government has mandated the consumption of ethanol while eliminating 
price supports, firms that are obligated to comply with the RFS will be forced to either leave the 
market or look to ways of making it profitable.  Because technologies leading to more efficient 
production of corn ethanol have plateaued, few options are available.  The discussion of ethanol 
subsidies over the last three decades leaves no reason to believe that they will not continue.  And 
because state subsidies are a more recent phenomenon, growth in this sector is at least as likely 
as it is at the federal level. 
 One implication of this analysis is that the agricultural lobby in states with fewer ethanol 
subsidies may look to states where there has been more success for new tactics.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the analysis suggests that timing can be critical when attempting to get new ethanol 
subsidies through the legislature.  While the size of the agricultural sector varies geographically, 
there is very little temporal variation.  The converse is true for party competition.  The partisan 
composition of each state changes every two years, and though partisan control changes 
infrequently, the level of competition varies from one election year to the next.  When 
competition gets tight, elected officials will scramble to satisfy the agricultural interests. 
  Overall, the results of this study lead to a better understanding of which states are more likely 
to subsidize ethanol and why they are likely to do so.  To say that ethanol will be subsidized by 
states that grow corn is common sense at best and tautological at worst.  But this study actually 
suggests that this relationship is not as strong as what might have been expected.   
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 Harold Lasswell’s (1936) classic definition of politics suggests that it is the study of “Who 
gets what, when, and how” (pp.3).  When the “what” is ethanol subsidies, this project answers 
the “who,” “when” and “how.”  Essentially, farmers get ethanol subsidies when there are a lot of 
them who can put pressure on the legislature at a time of high competition because neither party 
can afford to lose the agricultural vote.   
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